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Abstract  
This paper models the causes of the 2008 financial crisis together with its manifestations, using 
a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model. Our analysis is conducted on a cross-
section of 107 countries; we focus on national causes and consequences of the crisis, ignoring 
crosscountry “contagion” effects. Our model of the incidence of the crisis combines 2008 
changes in real GDP, the stock market, country credit ratings, and the exchange rate. We 
explore the linkages between these manifestations of the crisis and a number of its possible 
causes from 2006 and earlier. We include over sixty potential causes of the crisis, covering 
such categories as: financial system policies and conditions; asset price appreciation in real 
estate and equity markets; international imbalances and foreign reserve adequacy; 
macroeconomic policies; and institutional and geographic features. Despite the fact that we use 
a wide number of possible causes in a flexible statistical framework, we are unable to link most 
of the commonly-cited causes of the crisis to its incidence across countries. This negative 
finding in the cross-section makes us skeptical of the accuracy of “early warning” systems of 
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“we agree … that the FSB [Financial Stability Board] should collaborate with the IMF to provide early 
warning of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address them” 
• Final Communiqué G-20 Summit April 2, 2009(1) 
 
“Any early warning system to detect impending dangers to the world economy must find a way of 
bringing together the scatter of international and national macrofinancial expertise. We at the 
Fund have already begun intensifying our early warning capabilities and will be strengthening our 
collaboration with others involved in this area.” 
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1 MOTIVATION   
The 2008 global financial crisis is notable for a number of reasons, including most obviously its 
severity and speed. The international span of the crisis has also been remarkable; essentially all 
the industrialized countries have been affected, as well as a large number of developing and 
emerging economies. In this paper we seek to deepen our understanding of the international 
breadth of the crisis; we are particularly interested in modeling the causes of the crisis, and why 
its severity differs across countries. 
We are interested in understanding the causes of 2008 the crisis both out of intrinsic interest, 
and to investigate the feasibility of modeling financial crises like this empirically. 
Economists do not have a particularly good track record at predicting the timing of crises, which 
is one of the objectives of an early warning system.3 Historically however, the profession has 
had some success at modeling the incidence of crises across firms, banks, and/or countries.4 
That is, we find cross-sectional analysis easier than time-series analysis. In this paper, we attempt 
to model empirically the cross-country incidence of the financial crisis of 2008. Ours is an 
exploratory approach; we view it as a first step toward creating an international early-warning 
system, which necessarily includes both time-series and cross-sectional elements. Our 
objectives are: a) to determine whether the data patterns can be fitted within sample; and b) to 
provide preliminary evidence on which causes of the financial crisis seem to predict its ex post 
incidence across countries. 
We conduct a non-structural exercise, using a “MIMIC” (Multiple-Indicator Multiple Cause) 
model, which we apply to a cross-sectional data set of 107 countries. Our MIMIC specification 
explicitly acknowledges that the severity of a financial crisis is a continuous, rather than a 
discrete phenomenon, and one that can only be observed with error. It treats the severity of the 
financial crisis as a latent variable, observed only imperfectly in terms of such 2008 
manifestations as equity market collapses, exchange rate depreciations, recessionary growth, 
and declines in the perceptions of a country’s creditworthiness. The MIMIC methodology 
(described in more detail below) simultaneously links these “indicators” of a financial crisis with 
potential “causes” of the crisis. In the process, we obtain estimates of the severity of each 
country’s crisis experience, as well as estimates of the impact of potential causes of the crisis. 
Our data analysis yields a plausible set of estimates for the incidence and severity of the crisis 
across countries. That is, we can model empirically the fact that Iceland and Estonia were hit 
more severely in 2008 than say China. However, we have less success in linking crisis severity 
to its causes (dated from 2006 and earlier). Many hypotheses have been advanced in the 
literature regarding potential causes of the 2008 credit crisis; few emerge empirically as robust 
predictors of the severity of the crisis. Indeed, we find that only one variable – the size of the 
equity market run-up prior to the crisis – is a robust predictor of crisis severity.5 While the 
performance of this variable is intuitive, we find it surprising that other equally plausible 
variables fail to perform well (such as the magnitude of real estate price appreciation or the 
quality of the regulatory environment). Succinctly, we can reasonably model the severity of the 
crisis across countries, but we are unable to link it empirically to country-specific causes.   
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A successful early warning system must predict (out of sample) both the cross-country incidence  
 
of crises as well as their timing. Thus our analysis bodes poorly for the ability of early warning 
models to forecast future financial crises. After all, ours should be a (relatively) easy first step; 
we know now that a crisis took place in 2008, and which countries were affected. 
There can be three reasons for our predictive failure, assuming that we have not missed or 
grossly mis-measured one or more important causes of the crisis. First, it might simply be the 
case that the causes of the 2008 crisis differ across countries. If the cause of each country’s 
crisis is different, one would not expect to find any commonality when pooling the data across 
countries. Since the timing of the crisis coincided closely across countries, this “explanation” 
seems strained. Alternatively, the 2008 crisis might be the result of a truly global shock, so long 
as its incidence varied across countries in a way that is unrelated to the regulatory, financial, 
and macroeconomic “fundamentals” we consider. Finally, the shock might be a national one 
(plausibly originating in the United States) that spread contagiously across countries. We do not 
model international linkages between countries in our analysis, which could “explain” our poor 
findings. Under the last two interpretations, our negative results indicate that the susceptibility 
of a country to succumb to a common or contagious shock is unrelated to the fundamentals that 
we consider. 
All these interpretations seem like ominous warnings for early-warning models. If the causes of 
the crises differ across countries, there is little hope of finding a common statistical model to 
predict them. The same holds if common or contagious shocks are critical but a country’s ability 
to withstand a global or spreading shock is unrelated to fundamentals. We conclude that our 
negative results show that constructing a plausible statistical model that can predict financial 
crises (similar to that of 2008) will be challenging. 
 
 
2  DETERMINANTS OF THE CRISIS 
There has been little work on the 2008 crisis that seeks to understand its cross-country 
incidence. One exception is Ehrmann, et al (2009), who find a role for current accounts and 
foreign exchange reserves in determining equity portfolio returns for a cross section of 
countries, after conditioning for exposure to the United States.6 Still, most of the analysis has 
been conducted on a purely national basis, often analyzing only American data. In this section, 
we review the large literature that has already emerged concerning potential determinants of 
relative performance during the global financial crisis. Anticipating the empirical work done 














2.1  Size and Income 
We start with size and income levels, both factors used in the literature as crisis correlates (e.g. 
Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009 and Calvo and Loo-Kung, 2009). 
We condition on size throughout our analysis because it has been generally observed that 
smaller countries have fared poorly in the crisis. The importance of size was felt most strongly 
among smaller nations who had experienced exceptional economic growth and domestic credit 
expansion during the boom years. A notable example is Iceland, a country whose status as a 
global financial center left it facing liabilities far in excess of its gross domestic product after the 
collapse.  However, a number of smaller countries with their own currencies also had exposed 
financial sectors large relative to their domestic governments and economies (Buiter and Sibert, 
2008). Size is also negatively correlated with openness; smaller countries tend to be open to 
international trade. Small countries were thus also heavily exposed to the collapse of 
international trade and trade credit, other features of the 2008 crisis.8 For such reasons, we 
always include the natural logarithm of a country’s population in our analysis of potential causes 
of the 2008 crisis (data sources are described in an appendix). 
We also condition on income, as measured by the (log-) level of real GDP per capita. 
The 2008 crisis hit developed and emerging-market economies alike. It might seem that richer 
countries had advantages over poorer ones in responding to the crisis. For instance, the ability 
of a government to assist troubled financial institutions credibly seems clearly a function of 
domestic wealth. Nevertheless, this ability may have been correlated with the degree of 
exposure that domestic private agents took during the boom years, leaving rich nations as or 
more vulnerable than those of lower income. We consider the matter to be an empirical one, 
and accordingly, we condition on income throughout. 
We now turn to other potential causes of the financial crisis, beginning with regulatory and 
financial policy. 
 
2.2  Financial Policies 
 
The first major broad category of potential causes of the 2008 crisis that has drawn attention 
from the literature is the set of weaknesses exposed in national and international financial 
regulatory frameworks. Bernanke (2009) notes that the crisis revealed the need for 
improvement in supervisory practices and internal communication, particularly the need for 
maintaining strong risk-management practices in good times as well as bad. 
Buiter (2007) points to a number of flaws in the financial system that existed at the peak of the 
boom. These include excessive securitization, as well as investors and regulators placing too 
much faith in the opinions of private rating agencies. Spence (2008) argues that the asset price 
bubble was fuelled by a combination of excessive leverage and a widespread underestimation 
of increased systemic risk. Coval et al, (2009) argue that the excessively high ratings received 
by structured instruments are attributable to the excessive confidence that rating agencies had   




in their own abilities to assess risk Existing regulatory structures may also have encouraged 
“procyclicality” into lending behavior through the Basel capital requirements. Basel I contributed 
to the growth of securitization by assigning lower capital charges to securitized assets, thereby 
encouraging banks to move assets into off-balance sheet vehicles, Demirguc-Kunt and Serven, 
(2009). Coval et al, (2009) also argue that the process of securitization substitutes systematic 
risks for diversifiable risks. However, securitization could not have been the only source of 
regulatory weakness. Hall and Woodward (2009) point out that the United Kingdom lacked 
extensive securitization activity yet experienced a worse economic crisis than that in the United 
States. 
In addition to its preferential treatment of securitized assets, regulatory frameworks may have 
encouraged risk taking through the (implicit) designation of larger financial institutions as “too 
big to fail.” These guarantees likely encouraged these institutions to expose themselves to 
greater risk than they otherwise would have. Moreover, the guarantees themselves came to 
represent government liabilities as the likelihood increased that bailouts would be required, 
further raising systemic concerns and exacerbating the severity of a country’s economic 
position,e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Serven (2009). 
In addition to formal regulatory weaknesses, Bernanke (2009) argues that flaws also existed in 
the structure of competition and the improper incentives for risk-taking in financial institutions. 
He called for reforms ensuring that bonuses and other forms of compensation aligned the 
incentives of employees with those of their institutions. Institutional changes along 
these lines have been highlights to proposed reforms of the global financial system under Basel 
II [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009)]. Buiter (2009) argues that as the economic 
boom persisted, regulatory capture and corruption became commonplace. 
It should be stressed that these regulatory weaknesses were not confined to the United 
States. Buiter (2007) faults the regulatory structure of the Financial Services Agency and 
deficient banking insolvency laws for throwing Britain’s financial sector into disarray. He argues 
that the separation of power in Britain’s financial regulatory institutions left the agency that had 
the best information about financial sector difficulties (the FSA) incapable of conducting lender 
of last resort activity. However, Gieve (2009) argues that there were benefits to getting 
insurance and securities dealing under the same regulator at a time when the lines between 
these activities was breaking down. 
The deterioration in institutions also extended beyond the formal regulation of the financial 
system. Krugman noted that as the boom continued, the share of financial transactions outside 
the umbrella of traditional banking regulation increased.9 Many have also argued that the quality 
of corporate governance also deteriorated over the boom years; Buiter (2009) refers to a “… 
steady erosion in business ethics and moral standards.” As in the case of poor financial 
regulation, as long as firms were increasing markedly in market valuation, there was little 
incentive for equity or other stakeholders to rein in the activities of corporations. The extent of 
poor practices was revealed only after the bubble burst. 
While the crisis revealed weaknesses in the financial regulatory regime, technological advances 
in financial engineering exacerbated the process. In particular, asset securitization carved 
mortgage-backed (and other) securities into more-complicated structured products, leaving 
assets more opaque. Mishkin (2008) argues that advances in information technology and  
   
 
10 
financial innovations contributed to a “democratization of credit” that initially brought benefits to 
consumers, but eventually contributed to the financial crisis. Trichet (2009a) notes that while 
securitization brought the potential to increase diversification and enhance the management of 
risk, in practice it also allowed loan originators to sell credit immediately after it had been 
extended, effectively eliminating the incentives for proper risk management. 
Moreover, securitization reduced overall transparency by reducing incentives to collect and 
disseminate information about counterparty risk (Buiter, 2007). Another difficulty with 
securitization was that it broke the link between those who had originated the loan and those 
who were bearing the risk, reducing the incentives for loan originators to conduct proper due 
diligence prior to extending credit (De Michelis, 2009). 
We wish to account (albeit imperfectly) for the quality of the regulatory regime in our empirics 
below. Accordingly, we introduce a number of measures of the regulatory regime commonly 
used in the literature. Our measures include a number of variables from the Economic Freedom 
of the World database (EFW) including Bank Ownership (the share of bank deposits held in 
privately owned banks), Foreign Bank Competition (the denial rate of foreign bank license 
applications), Interest Rate Controls/ Negative Real Interest Rate (which measures credit market 
controls), and finally Credit Market Regulation (a summary score on the quality of regulation in 
credit markets). As is the case for all the potential crisis causes we investigate, these data are 
dated from 2006 (or sometimes earlier). We also include a number of measures dated 2003 
from the Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005) data set (hereafter “BCL”), including measures of 
Overall Capital Stringency, Ability to Take Prompt Corrective Action, a  Capital  Regulatory Index, 
Official Supervisory Power, Restructuring Power, and a measure of the Power 





2.3  Final Conditions 
 
At the end of the boom in 2008 many countries found themselves in precarious financial 
positions, in part because of regulatory policies, but also because of the natural “pro-cyclicality” 
of bank lending behavior. De Gregorio (2009) concludes that the ultimate cause of the crisis 
was increased fragility in the United States financial system. Brunnermeier (2009) also 
describes a decline in lending standards during the run-up to the crisis. Weak banks do not 
resist a financial crisis well. 
Certain financial market practices exposed the banking sector to potential deep financial 
distress. For example, Cecchetti (2008) notes that banks typically maintained short-term 
balance sheets in interbank lending markets. This allowed them to adjust the size and 
composition of their assets quickly during normal periods. However, when these markets seized 
up, banks found themselves illiquid. Moreover, bank lending practices became riskier. Feldstein 
(2009) notes that mortgage loan contracts in America gradually evolved from 70 to 80 percent 
of appraised value at origination, to 90 to 100 percent. White (2008) argues that some of the 
expansion of sub-prime and other risky mortgages was policy-induced, encouraged by  
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Congress’ strengthening of the Community Reinvestment Act, the loosening of down-payment 
standards by the Federal Housing Administration, and pressure on lenders from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to extend mortgages to a broader set of 
potential borrowers. 
That is, not all of the weaknesses may have been unintentional. 
Weaknesses in the financial sector manifested themselves in a number of dimensions that left 
economies exposed when conditions began to turn. During the boom, many countries 
experienced dramatic increases in the extension of domestic credit, both for investment and 
consumption, and the leverage of firms and households exploded. With the abrupt decline in the 
terms of credit extension, consumers and firms found themselves in need of dramatic 
deleveraging, leading to declines in both of these important components of GDP (Boone, 
Johnson and Kwak, 2009). 
Because we are interested in understanding the cross-country incidence of the crisis, we 
accordingly include a number of variables that measure the conditions of national financial 
sectors shortly before the crisis actually began. Of course, some of these variables are 
themselves outcomes of government policies, including the financial policies discussed above, 
and may therefore be endogenous to some of the policy variables listed above. 
As measures of relative domestic credit growth, we include Private Sector Domestic Credit as a 
share of GDP, Domestic Bank Credit as a share of GDP, and a measure of the share of domestic 
credit consumed by the Private Sector. As measures of bank strength going into the crisis, we 
include  Bank Liquid Reserves as a share of assets, the share of Non-Performing Loans,  Bank 





2.4  Asset Price Appreciation 
 
Every discussion of the causes of the global financial crisis includes the run-up in real estate 
values in the United States and elsewhere (e.g. Feldstein, 2009, and Teslik, 2009). Hall and 
Woodward (2009) claim that the collapse of spending on home building and the resulting 
recession was the “most important fact” about the American economy at the start of 2009. 
Feldstein (2008) argues that until housing prices stabilize, it will be impossible for the private 
sector to properly value mortgage-backed securities. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) note that 
American housing price appreciation prior to this crisis exceeded those in the previous “Big 
Five” postwar crises.11 Noting parallels with Japan’s experience, Shirakawa (2009) recalls the 
“irrational frenzy” that occurred in land prices in Japan prior to their collapse, and notes 
similarities among real estate values in Western economies prior to the 2008 crisis. 
One reason that the real estate boom is perceived as a source of fragility is that it channeled 
investment away from more productive areas into “unproductive residential construction” 
(Buiter, 2009). Another is that as the housing market cooled, household balance sheets 
deteriorated and many homeowners found themselves with negative housing equity (Feldstein, 
2009). U.S. Mortgage delinquencies have been highest in the areas that experienced the  
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greatest rate of price appreciation during the boom (Doms, et al, 2007). 
It is widely agreed that the magnitude of the real estate boom was increased by loose financial 
conditions. For example, Bernanke (2009a) notes that the housing boom was fueled in “large 
part” by a rapid expansion in mortgage lending. De Michelis (2009) notes that the boom in sub-
prime lending coincided with the real estate boom. Mian and Sufi (2008) find that zip codes with 
high latent demand for housing experienced large decreases in mortgage denial rates between 
2001 and 2005, even though these areas experienced poor economic performance over this 
period. This suggests that sub-prime mortgages facilitated the run-up in real estate prices in 
these areas. Moreover, Mayer, et al, (2009) note that mortgage defaults and delinquencies were 
particularly concentrated among mortgages that were classified as “subprime or near-prime.” 
However, U.S. real estate appreciation was not exorbitant relative to other OECD countries, 
suggesting that sub-prime lending alone, alone cannot explain the run-up in real estate prices 
(De Michelis, 2009); this was exceptionally prevalent in the United States. 
For all these reasons, run-ups in real estate prices are commonly considered important factors 
in determining relative economic vulnerability in the global financial crisis. The bubble in real 
estate values was paralleled by a run-up in other asset prices, especially in equity. It is widely 
thought that these “bubbles” were fueled by easy monetary policy and an underestimation of 
underlying risks in financial markets (Frankel, 2008). Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) demonstrate 
that equity price appreciation in the United States was even more dramatic than appreciations 
experienced during the “Big Five” post-war debt crises, and speculate that the cause was the 
“extraordinary amount” of stimulus provided by the Federal Reserve during the run-up to the 
crisis. As global economic activity slowed and equity prices fell, those countries that had 
experienced the greatest increases in equity prices during the boom period found themselves 
most vulnerable. 
We therefore include a number of measures of real estate and equity price appreciation. 
We include the Percentage Change in Real Estate Prices, based on data from the BIS and 
augmented by an Asia-specific study by Glindro, et al (2008). As measures of equity market 
appreciation, we include: Market Capitalization as a share of GDP; the value of Stocks Traded 
relative to GDP; and Stock Market Growth. 
 
 
2.5  International Imbalances 
 
Many countries built up precarious international financial positions over the boom years that 
became unsustainable when easy credit extension ceased (Buiter, 2009). The sources of these 
imbalances are controversial. Many observers, such as Buiter (2007) and Wolf (Teslik, 2009), 
identify the efforts by Asian and oil-exporting governments to build up large currency reserves 
as a source of the major global imbalances and subsequent excessive asset price appreciation 
in the west. 
This particularly includes China, which ran huge trade surpluses with developed countries and 
accumulated over $1 trillion in foreign reserves. However, Buiter (2009) also argues that the 
western nations were complicit in fueling these current account deficits through lax 
macroeconomic policies. In fact, those who point to monetary policy in the United States as a   




prominent factor in causing the crisis often argue that the imbalances would have been there 
even with a more flexible Chinese exchange rate (e.g. Mohan, 2009). 
Fratzscher (2009) finds that countries with worse than average current account positions 
experienced greater than average exchange rate depreciations during 2008. He also finds that 
countries with larger than average liabilities towards the United States also suffered larger than 
average exchange rate depreciations that year. He conjectures that US investors in need of 
dollar liquidity were reluctant to roll those credit extensions over during the most turbulent period 
of the financial crisis. 
Given a country’s current account position, its ability to manage that position is likely to be a 
function of its “war chest” of international reserves. Obstfeld, et al (2009) find that inadequate 
holdings of foreign exchange reserves relative to estimated “required” levels based on their 
theoretical specification was an important predictor of exchange rate depreciation in 2008. 
Fratzscher (2009) finds that adequate holdings of foreign exchange reserves significantly 
affected the exchange rate experiences of countries in 2008. He finds that countries with below 
average reserve holdings experienced a 23% average exchange rate depreciation against the 
dollar, while those with above-average holdings only experienced a 7% depreciation on 
average. 
We therefore include both measures of the severity of current account imbalances and the 
adequacy of holdings of foreign reserves. As measures of the external balance position, we 
include both stock and flow measures: the Net External Position, the Current Account (both 
measured as percentages of GDP, Debt Service as a percent of exports, External Debt as a 
percentage of gross national income, Gross Financing in International Capital Markets as a percent 
of GDP, and the Real Effective Exchange Rate (normalized to be 100 in the year 2000). 
As measures of the adequacy of foreign reserve holdings, we include Total Reserves as a 
percent of external debt, Short-Term Debt as a Percent of Reserves, Total Reserves over the Value 
of  a Month of Imports, M2 as a percent of Total Reserves minus Gold, and M2 as a percent of Central 
Bank Foreign Assets. 
 
2.6  Macroeconomic Policies 
Many have blamed easy have blamed lax macroeconomic policies for exacerbating current 
account imbalances and fueling the boom. Taylor-Rule based simulations indicate that the 
Federal Funds rate was below levels consistent with a 2% inflation target between 2003 and 
2006, sometimes by as much as 200 basis points (e.g. White, 2008). However, this viewpoint is 
not universal. For example, Hall and Woodward (2009) argue that the easy monetary policy at 
the start of the decade represented “responsible” monetary policy to head off deflation rather 
than an “… irresponsible contribution to a housing bubble.” 
In addition to expansionary monetary policy, others (e.g. De Long, 2009) point to the perception 
that the Federal Reserve stood ready to step in to support asset prices (the so-called 
Greenspan and Bernanke “puts”) as a cause for excessive asset price appreciation. 
Analysts have also pointed to lax fiscal policy as a source of vulnerability. Buiter (2009) argues 
that countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom pursued unsustainable fiscal  
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deficits that exacerbated the expansion of current account deficits. Moreover, he argues that lax 
fiscal policy has resulted in a loss of fiscal credibility in government’s capacity to address the 
global crisis. Large deficits have raised concerns that current expansionary fiscal policies will be 
resolved either by monetization or default. In turn, this concern has pushed up long-term 
interest rates, reducing the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical instrument. 
Alternatively, some speculate that such concerns may encourage governments to resist fiscal 
easing, thereby exacerbating the economic downturns. As measures of cross-sectional 
differences in monetary regimes, we include a dummy indicating if a country is a Currency Union 
member, the Aggregate GDP of a Country’s Monetary Zone, a dummy indicating countries that are 
members of the European Union, but not the European Monetary Union, a dummy indicating of a 
country is an Inflation Targeter, M2 as a percent of GDP, and M3 as a percent of GDP. As 
measures of cross-sectional differences in fiscal policies, we include the Government Budget 
Surplus/Deficit as a share of GDP, the stock of Central Government Debt as a share of GDP, the 
stock of Total Debt as share of GDP, and the Debt Service Burden as a share of GDP. We also 
control for cross-country differences in macroeconomic conditions going into the crisis by 
including a measure of CPI Inflation and a measure of GDP Growth.
13 
 
2.7  Institutional Factors 
We also search for the effects of institutional features across countries in crisis severity. 
Acemoglu, et al (2003) find that countries with inferior institutional features suffer from increased 
macroeconomic volatility, to the extent that after controlling for institutional differences, 
macroeconomic policy differences only play a limited role in explaining crosscountry volatility 
differences. 
To control for institutional differences, we include the EFW index of Credit/Labor/Business 
Regulation, the Polity index, a measure of Constraints on the Executive (also taken from the Polity 
data set), a measure of Overall Economic Freedom, a dummy indicating a Common Law country, 
indices of Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, the quality of enforcement of the Rule of Law, 
Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and the EFW measures of Government Size, Security of Property 
Rights, and Sound Money Access. 
 
2.8  Geography 
 
Our final set of considerations is geographic; such features may have played a role in relative 
performance as well. Iceland’s proximity to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands made it an 
attractive destination for British and Dutch depositors, perhaps contributing to the expansion of 
its financial sector (Danielsson, 2008). Similarly, Eastern Europe experienced waves of 
investment during the boom not enjoyed by more remote economies. While these investments 
initially promoted rapid expansion of these proximate economies, they left these countries more 
exposed to a reversal of fortune in the wake of a global “sudden stop” in credit extension. 
To control for geographic differences, we include the Log of Latitude, and dummies for East Asian  
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countries,  Central/Eastern Europe, Central Asian countries,  Commodity Exporters, and English 
Speaking countries. 





3 EMPIRICAL  STRATEGY 
We examine an international cross-section, using country-specific information. Thus we ignore 
linkages between countries almost completely; these would be relevant if the crisis spread 
“contagiously.” However, even if the shocks that precipitated the crisis were common and/or 
spread contagiously, national fundamentals may help determine the actual incidence of the 
crisis across countries. Accordingly, we model the severity of the financial crisis as a function of 




3.1  The Sample of Data 
 
We are interested in examining a broad cross-section of countries and territories.
15  
We wish to include all the countries that have been dramatically affected by the crisis as well as 
a number of other countries that have not been affected as badly (as controls). Since the 
incidence of the crisis was notable among high-income countries, we include all of them as well 
as a large number of developing countries. In particular, we examine all countries with real GDP 
per capita of at least $10,000 in 2003. To this set of countries, we add those with real GDP per 
 capita of at least $4,000 and a population of at least one million.16 We are left with a sample of 
107 countries; their names are tabulated in an appendix.
17 
    
 
 
3.2  Identifying Cross-sectional Differences in Crisis Severity 
Identifying the incidence of a financial crisis (currency, asset, banking, or other) across 
countries is no simple matter, let alone determining its severity (e.g. Berg, et al, 2004). Any 
reasonable methodology should take into account the fact that potentially serious measurement 
error is inherently present. 
We begin with a simple non-structural approach. In particular, we consider four observable  
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indicators of the crisis, and model the incidence and severity of the crisis as being a latent 
variable that can be linked to these variables. When measuring these manifestations of the 
crisis, we restrict ourselves insofar as possible to data from 2008 (we sometimes use data from 
early 2009).
18 
Our first measure of the 2008 crisis is real GDP growth over 2008, as estimated by the Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) in early March 2009.
19  We also consider a broad range of financial 
variables covering stocks, bonds, and international finance. Above and beyond growth, we 
include: 1) the percentage change in a broad measure of the national stock market over the 
2008 calendar year (collected from national sources); 2) the percentage change in the SDR 
(multilateral) exchange rate over 2008 (measured as the domestic currency price of a Special 
Drawing Right and taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics); and 3) the change in 
the country credit rating from Institutional Investor. The latter are ratings created by Institutional 
Investor that rank 177 countries on a scale between 0 and 100 where 100 represents the least 
likelihood of default (as of March 2009, Switzerland was the most highly rated country 
 with a score of 94.0, while Zimbabwe brought up the rear at 4.6).
20 Institutional Investor publishes 
these rankings biannually in March and September; we use the change between March 2008 
and March 2009.
21 We also use an analogue from Euromoney for sensitivity analysis. Our four 
measures of the consequences/manifestations of the crisis are presented for forty key countries 
of interest in Table 1. The four indicators are not particularly tightly related, as shown by the 
correlation matrix of Appendix Table A3.  How should these four factors be combined 
appropriately? Perhaps the most  straightforward way to proceed is to extract a common 
component from the four variables using  purely statistical techniques and examine its 
characteristics. Accordingly, we estimate a single  factor using conventional factor analysis; 
estimates for the “top-40” countries are presented in Table 2. Our default factor is estimated 
using the method of principal factors on our four variables, with regression scoring (because of 
missing data, the estimates are actually derived from 85 observations).
22 Three variants of the 
factor are also included for sensitivity analysis:  one replaces the change in the Institutional 
Investor country credit rating with the analogue from Euromoney; another drops the exchange 
rate (since some countries use the exchange rate as an objective or instrument of monetary 
policy); and a final variant estimates the factor via maximum likelihood. 
Our four different variables measuring the severity of the crisis are strongly positively correlated 
with each other and deliver broadly similar rankings. A number of countries have been 
particularly hard hit by the crisis, and these show up at the top of our list. These include Iceland 
most especially; Iceland’s fall from grace was particularly striking and has been much noted (as 
of March 2009, Icelandic GDP was forecast by the EIU to shrink by 12% in 2009). 
However, a number of other countries have also been hit hard including the Baltic countries 
  (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the Ukraine, Ireland, Korea, New Zealand, the UK, and 
Hungary. All these countries appear towards the top of our list of crisis countries; the plausibility 
of the extreme cases lends credibility to this exercise. 
While most of the results in Table 2 seem plausible, our cross-section also includes some 
surprising results. For instance, we find Japan – whose GDP decline was particularly severe in 
the 4th quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 – is characterized as relatively unaffected by 
the global crisis. In part, this performance is likely explained by the appreciation of the yen, an 
idiosyncratic event associated with the unwinding of the yen “carry trade” that was part of the  
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financial crisis. While one can explain such phenomena, we interpret such mis-characterizations 
not as outliers that should be expunged, but as warnings that should make one cautious. In 
practice, even determining which countries have been more or less affected by crises can rarely 
be determined by a simple mechanistic manipulation of standard economic variables.  
 
3.3  Linking Incidents and Causes: First Pass 
Given an estimate of the incidence of the crisis across countries, one can then attempt to link 
crisis incidence to its potential causes. We do this by using a host of possible determinants of the 
crisis related to the voluminous literature cited above. To avoid endogeneity issues as much as 
possible with such an exercise, as well as speak to the potential performances of early warning 
models, we restrict ourselves to data from 2006 and earlier for our crisis causes. 
We begin with a simple examination of whether our crude measures of crisis incidence can be 
linked to the size and income of a country.23 Figure 1 presents scatter-plots of our four different 
measures of crisis incidence (on the ordinate); each is graphed against the natural logarithm of 
2006 population (on the abscissa; this is taken from the World Bank’s World  Development 
Indicators). Our default measure is portrayed in the top-left graph, and shows only a cloud of 
data with a small negative relationship between crisis intensity and size (Iceland is visible as a 
small country hit hard by the crisis). The other three variants include a nonparametric data 
smoother, and also show a slight negative correlation between crisis incidence and size. That 
is, the intensity of the crisis does not seem to be strongly linked to country size. By way of 
contrast, a country’s income is more strongly (negatively) correlated with crisis intensity. Figure 
2 shows that the negative relationship is present for all four variants of the crisis measure, 
measuring income with the log of real 2006 GDP per capita (the relationship is somewhat 
weaker when the factor is estimated with maximum likelihood).
24 
The impressions given in Figures 1 and 2 are graphical in nature and accordingly informal. 
However, they can easily be corroborated more rigorously with standard statistical techniques. 
Table 3 provides estimates of OLS coefficients from a regression of our default factor on the 
natural logarithms of 2006 population and real income per capita; standard errors robust to the 
presence of heteroskedasticity are presented parenthetically. Size has a negligible effect on 
factor incidence, but income seems to have a sizeable negative effect which is significantly 
different from zero at conventional confidence levels. This conclusion does not depend on the 
exact way that the factor is estimated, and is consistent with the graphical evidence of Figures 1 
and 2. This tentative evidence points toward an income effect on crisis incidence but no clear 
size effect. Nevertheless, we continue to include both effects as controls in our analysis below. 
A different tack on these issues is to examine the effect of income and regional groupings. The 
World Bank splits countries into eight bins, and we use these to create simple binary variables. 
There are two groups of high-income countries, OECD and non-OECD. 
Developing countries are divided into six regional groupings: East Asia and Pacific; Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa; 
and the Middle East and North Africa. We drop the last region and add seven appropriately 
constructed dummies to our regressions in place of population and size. These show much the  
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same pattern. First, income matters negatively: the OECD dummy is quite negative, the 
coefficient on high-income non-OECD less so, and not all the developing country coefficients 
are statistically significant. The estimates indicate that Eastern Europe and Central Asian 
countries have been quite adversely affected by the crisis. We also obtain statistically significant 
negative coefficients for the Sub-Saharan countries and the developing South-Asian countries. 
One way to proceed next would be to run regressions of our extracted factor(s) on a host of 
possible causes of the crisis (controlling for size and income). For instance, we include a 
measure of the buildup in the stock market in the final column at the extreme right of Table 3 (it 
has a statistically insignificant coefficient). However, given that we have a large number of 
potential causes and indicators without a directly observable measure of the crisis, we prefer to 
model these features collectively and explicitly with a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) 
model. 
 
    
3.4  The MIMIC Model 
 
The Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model was introduced to econometrics by 
Goldberger (1972). Aigner et al (1984) provide a general introduction to latent variable models, 
while Gertler (1988) has a nice exposition and empirical application; we follow Gertler’s 
exposition below. 
 




where: yi,j is an observation on crisis indicator j for country i, xi,k is an observation for potential 
crisis cause k for country i; ξi is a latent variable representing the severity of the crisis for 
country i (or lack thereof in our case); β and γ are vectors of coefficients, and ν and ζ are 
wellbehaved disturbances.
25 Equation (1) links J consequences and manifestations of the crisis 
(denoted by y) to the unobservable measure of crisis severity. In practice, we model this 
measurement equation using our ( J = 4 ) indications of the crisis (the 2008 national changes in: 
a) real GDP, b) the stock market, c) the credit rating, and d) the exchange rate). The second  
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equation models the determination of the crisis as a function of K causes (x’s, dated 2006 or 
earlier). 
By substituting (2) into (1), we can derive a model which is no longer a function of the latent 
variable ξ. This MIMIC model is a system of J equations with right-hand-sides restricted to be 
proportional to each another. These proportionality restrictions constrain the structure to be a 
“one-factor” model of the latent variable; with the addition of a normalization, they achieve 
identification of the parameters in (1) and (2). One of the features of the MIMIC model is that it 
explicitly incorporates measurement error about a key variable – the incidence and severity of 
the crisis – in a non-trivial and plausible way.26 Indeed, this is one of the chief attractions of the 
MIMIC model to us.
27 
We estimate our MIMIC models in STATA with GLLAMM; Rabe-Hesketh et al (2004a, b) 
provide further details. The iterative estimation technique begins with adaptive quadrature which 
is followed by Newton-Raphson.
28 We normalize and achieve identification by imposing a factor 
loading of unity on the stock market change.
29 
In Table 4 we report estimates of γ when we include only the logs of 2006 population and 
  real GDP per capita as potential causes in (2); it is thus roughly analogous to Table 3. 
Following Table 3, we also provide sensitivity analysis by using three different versions of our 
latent variables. We include our four default indicators as measures of the crisis (the same as 
those used in Table 3 and tabulated in Table 1). Using a MIMIC model, we estimate our latent 
variable from the four underlying crisis indicators and simultaneously link it to size and income 
as causes of the crisis; we tabulate estimates of the impact of size and income on this latent 
variable in Table 4. These results mirror those from the factor analysis of Table 3. The other two 
measures are variants for sensitivity analysis: one replaces the Institutional Investor country 
credit rating with its analogue from Euromoney  while the second drops the exchange rate 
indicator. It is reassuring to see that size has no significant impact on the incidence of crises 
across countries, while income has a significantly negative impact. With this robustness check 
passed, we proceed on to investigate the cross-country determinants of the financial crisis. 
4  CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
We add each of our potential causes to the default MIMIC model of Table 4 one by one, and 
report the estimates in Table 5, retaining size and income as causes throughout. Thus the top-
left cell in Table 5 is the (γ) coefficient for the effect of private bank ownership on the latent 
variable of crisis incidence (ξ). As with all other cells in the column, the estimate is taken from 
our default MIMIC model; four crisis indicators are used to model ξ, while size and income are 
included as causes ( x ’s), but not recorded so as to conserve on space.
30 Thus each row in the 
column tabulates the effect of adding a single extra cause to our MIMIC model, conditional on 
including size and income.
31, 32 
We also include in Table 5 four other columns of sensitivity analysis. Each is constructed 
analogously to our column of default results, but perturbs the methodology in some way so as to 
show the sensitivity of our results. The first column to the right of the default uses the Euromoney 
country credit ranking in place of that from Institutional Investor, while the second drops the 
exchange rate change as a crisis indicator. Another uses a different MIMIC model estimator  
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(replacing adapative quadrature with Gauss-Hermite quadrature); a fourth substitutes the 
income and regional dummy variables of Table 3 in place of the continuous measures of (log) 
population and income. 
The results are disappointing and weak in the sense that relatively few of the potential causes 
we investigate have a statistically significant impact on crisis incidence (conditional, as 
always, on size and income effects). For instance, countries that have experienced a run-up in 
real estate prices are often viewed as those that have suffered most severely in the crisis. 
However, when we include the percentage change in real estate prices between 2003 and 2006 
as a potential cause of the crisis, it does not have an effect that is statistically different from zero 
at conventional levels.
33 The same is true of almost all of the (over sixty) additional causes that 
we add in the remainder of the table. 
It should be stressed that this observed weakness is not simply an artifact of the MIMIC 
framework. As an example, Figure 3a plots one of our measures of the adequacy of the 
financial regulatory framework – the capital regulatory index of Barth, Caprio and Levine (2003) 
– against each of the four crisis indicator variables. Regulatory conditions are commonly cited 
as determinants of the relative performance of the exposure of countries to the economic crisis. 
However, even in a simple scatter plot without any control variables, it is clear that there is no 
systematic relationship between this commonly-cited causal variable and our crisis indicators. 
Indeed, only one of the scatter plots displays a positive correlation between the measure and 
subsequent performance, and this relationship is completely insignificant.
34 
We obtain similar results for most of the other variables that we investigate as potential crisis 
determinants; Figures 3b-3h are analogues to Figure 3a that portray a number of other 
potentially important crisis determinants. With the exception of the equity market appreciation 
variable (portrayed in Figure 3b) which exhibits its expected negative correlation, there appears 
to be little or no correlation between our measures of crisis determinants and crisis 
manifestations. 
Figure 4 repeats this exercise but graphs twelve potential causal variables against our 
estimated latent crisis variable (not the four underlying indicators of the crisis). We again see 
modest negative correlations for the log of real GDP per capita and equity market appreciations, 
but little else. In particular, nations’ current account positions, which entered positively in the 
univariate specifications with regional dummies excluded, are now insignificant as well. 
Possible exceptions include our measures of financial conditions, including domestic bank credit 
(relative to GDP) and bank capital (as a percent of total assets); both exhibit modest negative 
relationship with our latent variable. There are a few exceptions to our generally weak results. 
Countries that experienced a large run-up in the stock market (measured relative to output) 
between 2003 and 2006 were more likely to be hit by the 2008 crisis. Countries with larger 
current account deficits and fewer reserves (measured relative to short-term debt) were also 
more vulnerable. There is weaker evidence that countries with high credit growth and a more 
levered banking sector are also associated with the severity of the crisis. We also know that 
some of the Eastern European and Baltic countries have been hard-hit, and this is apparent 
when we include geographic dummies. 
Nevertheless, few of our potential causes have strong effects that are robust across slightly 
different specifications of our MIMIC model. For instance, a dummy variable that identifies large 
commodity exporters is typically statistically insignificant.
35  Our results clearly suggest that  
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measurable pre-existing conditions across countries had little common impact on the relative 
severity of these countries’ crisis experiences, as observed within our MIMIC framework. 
It may be the case that the results in Table 5 are weak because they add causes to our basic 
MIMIC model one by one rather than simultaneously. While we are skeptical of this 
interpretation, we investigate it further in Table 6. This takes our default MIMIC model and adds 
a set of eleven causes simultaneously (above and beyond size and income). Unfortunately our 
results here are even worse than those obtained in Table 5; almost none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant, with the exception of the stock market variable and the Central- Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia dummy. Both of these enter at statistically significant levels when the short-
term debt/reserves variable is excluded.
36 
Overall, it must be concluded that the variables we investigate as potential determinants of the 
financial crisis of 2008 deliver only disappointing results. While many seem like they should be 
empirically relevant determinants, in practice they are simply not closely linked to crisis severity. 
These results indicate that creating an empirically viable early warning system will be 
challenging; such a system must conquer all the problems we faced, while also being able 
to predict the timing of future crises out of sample. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper examines the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008. 
We use a MIMIC (Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause) model that exploits a cross-section of 
aggregate data from 107 countries. Our approach explicitly acknowledges that the severity of 
the crisis is a continuous variable that is only observed with error. We investigate the 
importance of a broad set of potential causes of the crisis in a relatively unstructured empirical 
specification, thereby allowing the data to speak as loudly as possible. Our reasoning is that 
success in a cross-sectional approach is a necessary (but far from sufficient) condition for any 
reliable early warning system, which must also confront additional problems such as predicting 
the timing of crises out of sample. We examine a large number of potential explanatory variables 
for the crisis that have been discussed in the literature; these cover a host of “fundamentals” 
including the regulatory framework, financial conditions, and the macroeconomic, institutional, 
and geographic features of a country. However, we found almost none of our posited variables 
seem to be statistically significant determinants of crisis severity; they simply do not account for 
the incidence of the crisis across countries. While we can model the incidence of the crisis 
reasonably well, we have been unable to link the severity of the crisis across countries to its 
causes. 
One potential reason why our results are weak may be that we have poor measures of the 
fundamental determinants of the crisis, or of its incidence. Our data on crisis manifestations 
were collected in the early Spring of 2009, and may not adequately capture the full extent of the 
financial crisis. Still, our measures of crisis incidence and severity seem intuitive and  
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reasonable; our problem seems to be explaining the crisis of 2008, not measuring it. 
However, there are two other possible reasons for the weakness of our results, both of which 
bode poorly for the performance of early warning models. First, a potentially serious problem 
with our approach is that we model the cross-country incidence of the crisis as being due to 
national  characteristics. This is inappropriate if the fundamental causes of the crisis are 
international in nature, for instance because the crisis spreads contagiously or is the result of a 
common shock. Still, our negative results imply that even if the crisis was transmitted across 
countries through one or more channels, its incidence seems unrelated to national 
fundamentals. 
Alternatively, a plausible interpretation for our weak results is that it is quite difficult to model the 
determinants of crises. Perhaps the causes of the 2008 crisis were idiosyncratic and lack a 
common explanation; perhaps the linkages exist but are opaque and cannot be easily quantified 
with observable data. Essentially what we have shown here is that the cross-country causes of 
the financial crisis are hard to pin down with standard econometric techniques. 
Negative results like ours in a cross-section make us dubious about the accuracy of an early 
warning model that will have all the problems we have encountered and, in addition, the 
problem of predicting the timing of future crises. So, with the caveat that the data we use 
represent only early evidence concerning the manifestations of the global financial crisis, we 
conclude that our paper provides an early warning that model-based early warning systems are 
unlikely to predict future crises accurately. 
 








































Table 4: The Effect of Size and Income in the MIMIC Model 
 
  




Table 5: Adding Causes to the MIMIC Model, One by One 
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Table 6: Adding Causes to the MIMIC Model Simultaneously 
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Appendix Table A2: Key Data Sources 
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